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Energy security through the establishment of microgrids is a national security 
issue that has garnered much research since the turn of the 21st century. Small modular 
nuclear reactors (SMRs) can be a viable option for Department of Defense (DOD) 
investment to further establish a microgrid concept for military installations. Such an 
application could enhance the benefits of a dedicated microgrid by providing assured 
power over unexpectedly long periods of disruption to external sources, and could also 
help stabilize the microgrid to better accommodate intermittent renewable energy 
sources. This study analyzes the business case for investment in SMR technology for 
energy security. Looking at the explicit costs and benefits of the investment using net 
present value (NPV) metrics can inform a policy maker’s decision to invest in a project. 
Our analysis indicates the DOD should not invest in SMRs at this time. The technology 
lacks proof of concept and carries the risks associated with being an initial investor. The 
DOD should continue to pursue microgrid initiatives and keep SMRs under consideration 
while allowing private industry to further advance SMR technology. 
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I. THE NEED FOR ASSURED POWER 
Department of Defense (DOD) installations rely heavily on the commercial grid 
for electric power. They commonly use diesel generators as the source of backup power 
for critical services if the grid’s power is interrupted. The grid is vulnerable to numerous 
threats, including extreme weather or other natural events, physical, cyber or 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack and issues related to an aging infrastructure. The 
diesel generators utilized as the backup are designed to supply power for a period of days. 
If a major outage were to occur, lasting weeks or months, the generators can be 
vulnerable due to limited fuel supply and potential breakdown from overuse. Military 
installations’ continuous operations are vital to national security, particularly if an outage 
is caused by a deliberate threat. Military bases should be able to operate independently of 
the commercial grid if necessary. In order to achieve the goal of assured power, the DOD 
should work toward the concept of a microgrid. A microgrid can be powered by multiple 
power sources to reduce the risk of a total blackout and by definition has a severable 
connection to the commercial grid. The incorporation of a small modular reactor (SMR) 
as the anchor power supply for such a microgrid would enable a significant enhancement 
in the level of assurance and robustness of such a system especially in light of a possible 
disruption of external power sources over an extended period of time. 
A. THE VULNERABLE COMMERCIAL GRID 
This section discusses the major threats to the U.S. electrical grid and their 
potentially devastating impacts. It is important to have a basic understanding of these 
threats to appreciate how they can impact national security and continued operations of 
the military. 
1. Aging Infrastructure 
The U.S. electrical grid began widespread development in the early 1900s and 
expanded rapidly post World War II, as demand for electricity grew across the country. 
More than 70% of today’s transmission lines are older than 25 years, and the average age 
of a power plant in the United States is 30 years (Campbell, 2012). Richard Campbell’s 
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report also noted that the average lifetime expectancy of a power plant is around 40 years. 
Much of the transmission and distribution (T&D) infrastructure is coming to the end of 
its useful life (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2016). The old infrastructure 
can be attributed to the challenges that exist for electrical companies to invest in new 
T&D. Siting for a new transmission line can be difficult due to growing environmental 
concerns, permitting, right-of-way limitations, and easement negotiations. Electric 
companies need to generate enough revenue to recover construction costs. This is 
complicated by the interconnected nature of the U.S. grid. A new transmission line 
creates benefits for multiple consumers not just the local market of the company which 
builds it (EIA, 2016). 
A sign that the grid is becoming more unreliable is evident when you consider 
research and development (R&D) expenditures from 1993 to 2006. From 1993 to 2000, 
annual R&D expenditures fell from $741 million to $193 million, a 74 percent drop 
(Amin, 2011). In contrast, between 2001 and 2006, R&D expenses in the electric industry 
were a mere 0.17 percent of revenues (Amin, 2011). This reduction in R&D expenses led 
to a drastic increase in outages. According to EIA data, from 2000–2004 there were 149 
outages affecting more than fifty thousand customers. From 2005 to 2009, there were 349 
outages of the same magnitude. These outages cost the economy around $49 billion per 
year (Amin, 2011). Until there is a greater incentive for power companies to invest in 
new infrastructure for improved grid reliability, this decline can be expected to continue. 
The more vulnerable the commercial grid is to old infrastructure the more vulnerable the 
military is to potential power interruptions. 
2. Weather 
Weather has historically been a common cause of power outages. The percentage 
of power outages caused by weather vary depending upon the study. Some studies have 
reported outage percentages due to weather as low as 44 percent while other estimates are 
as high as 78 percent. (Campbell, 2012) Regardless of the exact number, weather is the 
most common cause of outages. Additionally, the number of weather-related outages 
have increased significantly since the mid-1990s. The aging infrastructure adds to the 
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vulnerability of outages caused by weather (Marqusee, Schultz, & Robyn, 2017). 
Unfortunately, weather is a vulnerability that we cannot control directly, but we can 
mitigate its potential impacts. One of the best ways to mitigate this vulnerability is to put 
transmission lines underground. While the cost of burying these lines can be far greater 
than the traditional aboveground lines, when you compare that to the approximately $50 
billion lost annually to power outages, it appears that it could be an appropriate 
investment.   
3. Cyber Vulnerability 
In today’s world, efficiency is a key element of waste and cost reduction. With the 
introduction of smart grid technology, more and more power systems are optimized 
through the use of computers. While computers make the power grid “smarter,” they also 
add a very serious risk of attack by hostile actors. There have been multiple news reports 
in the past decade of utilities being infiltrated by cyber criminals. The most notable 
occurred in Ukraine, when Russian hackers infiltrated the power grid causing widespread 
disruption to customers. Some might think because the United States is a developed 
country, our grid is not vulnerable to such exploits. However, in 2009 The Wall Street 
Journal reported, “Cyberspies have penetrated the U.S. electrical grid and left behind 
software programs that could be used to disrupt the system, according to current and 
former national-security officials” (Gorman, 2009, para. 1). Reuters reported recently that 
GE is working to fix a software bug after they discovered hackers could take control of 
parts of the U.S. grid (Finkle, 2017). The cyber threat to the U.S. commercial grid is real 
and some officials believe if we get into conflict with a country such as Russia or China, 
they could use this capability (Gorman, 2009). The military is as vulnerable to this threat 
as a domestic consumer, which is another reason to invest in assured power through a 
microgrid concept. 
4. EMP Attack 
Electromagnetic Pulse attack (EMP) represents one of the most devastating forms 
of attack on the power grid. Because the North American grid is made up of three major 
interconnections, an attack of a central location could have widespread impacts. “It is not 
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surprising that a single EMP attack may well encompass and degrade at least 70% of the 
Nation’s electrical service, all in one instant” (Foster et al., 2004, p. 18). This cascading 
effect would take significant time to restore, and military installations relying on the 
commercial grid would feel the effects. There exist two main ways to mitigate this 
vulnerability. First, the power sources, distribution hardware and transmission lines could 
be buried underground or otherwise hardened so the EMP attack would have no effect. 
Second, military installations could be on their own microgrid with a severable link to the 
commercial grid. Ideally, the entire U.S. grid needs to be more resilient against the 
possibility of an EMP attack. The reality is that applying the former hardening measures 
to the entire grid in the near term is not likely to be fiscally feasible. To maintain our 
ability to fight against a hostile actor who would carry out an EMP attack, the military 
needs assured power separate from the commercial grid.  
5. Physical (Kinetic Attack) 
Physical attack of major infrastructure is a threat to be considered whether as a 
result of terrorism or armed military conflict. In either case, the commercial grid can be 
expected to be a target of our adversaries. Physical attack can be executed a couple of 
ways including bombings and direct infiltration by adversaries. The threat of a bombing 
attack can come from nation states as well as terrorist organizations. Bombings could 
occur during major conflict from an adversary either through long range missile or 
aircraft bombings. A terrorist organization may utilize a car or truck bomb to inflict 
damage. Direct infiltration would allow an adversary to gain access to a power 
installation, either a major power plant or a substation, and cause significant damage to 
potentially generate a large-scale cascading power outage. 
The threat of physical attack supports two arguments for assured power on DOD 
installations. First, if a microgrid is established on an installation and the major power 
source is within the gates then it is harder for an adversary to conduct a direct infiltration 
because all military installations have entry control points with guards. This is not the 
case for all commercial power installations, with nuclear being the exception. Secondly, 
the argument for putting transmission lines and the small modular reactor (SMR) 
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underground will provide added security for direct infiltration but also make it more 
difficult to cause damage through bombing or other explosive attack of the installation. 
This holds true whether the plant is built offsite or not. The commercial grid is relatively 
unprotected and therefore vulnerable to conventional attack, while DOD installations 
have the benefit of a greatly enhanced security environment. 
B. THE UNRELIABLE BACKUP POWER 
The current built-in resiliency for military installations consists of diesel 
generators as backup power in case of an outage. The backup generators are assigned to 
critical loads for continued operations. This concept is feasible as long as the outage is 
short in duration. Imagine a scenario where the outage goes for weeks or even months. 
This scenario raises some questions of the reliability of the diesel generators and the 
vulnerability of a continuous fuel supply to keep them running. For longer duration 
outages, many non-critical loads would eventually require power. Because the diesel 
generators are already earmarked to critical loads, there is little flexibility as load 
demands of military installations evolve over time (Marqusee et al., 2017). The largest 
issue regarding these generators is how well they are maintained. According to The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), proper testing of these generators is performed 
on only 60 percent of military installations. Due to this gap in testing and maintenance, 
their reliability is brought into question (Marqusee et al., 2017). The effectiveness of 
back-up diesel generators may not be proven until a major base experiences an extended 
outage. The DOD needs to invest now in the microgrid concept with its own independent 
and reliable major power sources. 
C. THE MICROGRID CONCEPT 
While there are many differing definitions of what is a microgrid, the Department 
of Energy (DOE) Microgrid exchange Group uses the following definition:  
A microgrid is a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy 
resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single 
controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid can connect and 
disconnect from the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or 
island mode. (Department of Energy [DOE], 2012, p. 1)  
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A key advantage of a microgrid is that it can be severed from the larger commercial grid. 
When a microgrid disconnects itself from the larger grid, it is operating in “island mode.” 
The power sources can be of different types to include renewables such as wind and solar 
or traditional sources such as natural gas, coal and nuclear. Diversification of power 
sources within a microgrid is ideal for redundancy. If one power source goes down, 
another can pick up the load. The limiting factor to added resiliency is cost. Utilization of 
a microgrid for assured power will give the military the enhanced ability to operate 
through a prolonged outage of the commercial grid. During periods of normal 
commercial grid operation, in principle the DOD can also sell excess capacity to help 
recover costs of the microgrid.   
“The two variables that have the greatest impact on the performance of a DOD 
installation microgrid are the degree of integration of the microgrid with the larger 
macrogrid and the technical complexity of the microgrid, particularly its choice of 
generation resources (Van Broekhoven, Judson, Nguyen, & Ross, 2012, p. 8).” The level 
of integration between the two grids will largely determine how much value a microgrid 
can garner from a utility company for a unit of electricity. A microgrid that can respond 
quickly to increases in grid demand will create more value for the utility and ultimately 
more financial benefit will be passed on to the installation (Van Broekhoven et al., 2012). 
There are many different ways one could set up a microgrid depending on the 
location, size and budget for a given grid. The DOD has a strong interest in the microgrid 
concept, both to reduce cost while also improving energy security. Marine Corps Air 
Station Miramar and the Marine Corps Base at Twenty Nine Palms have microgrids in 
development (Marqusee et al., 2017). Widespread employment of microgrids in the 
future is key for the DOD achieving energy security in the case of a major future conflict. 
The Secure Automated Microgrid Energy System (SAMES) is a proposed 
microgrid developed and modeled by the private firm Power Analytics. In April 2017 the 
firm released a report sponsored by the Environmental Security Technology Certification 
Program (ESTCP) on their microgrid concept and findings. According to that report, the 
SAMES objective is to create a cluster microgrid across three geographically separated 
locations, the Naval Bases San Diego, Coronado, and Point Loma (Meagher, 2016). The 
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focus of the project was to demonstrate the ability to create the microgrid using much of 
the existing infrastructure already in place to control costs while also meeting current 
DOD cyber security policies and standards. The SAMES team created a mirrored site at 
the Colorado State University Power House Inegrid Lab to demonstrate the system 
(Meagher, 2016).  
While no action has been taken on the SAMES project after the publishing of the 
initial report in the spring of 2017, this thesis focuses on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) 
as a viable option to power a microgrid cluster made up of the three naval installations 
outlined in the SAMES report, Naval Bases San Diego, Coronado, and Point Loma.  
D. STUDY APPROACH 
Naval shore installations are at risk to the vulnerabilities of the commercial 
electric grid. A microgrid cluster of several installations, such as the one presented in the 
SAMES report, mitigates some of those critical vulnerabilities by giving the installations 
a severable connection to the grid and the ability to operate some critical loads through 
the use of back-up generators and on-site renewables. The addition of a major power 
source in the form of a SMR to the microgrid cluster would allow the Navy to operate in 
parallel with the commercial grid while providing nearly all of the electricity needs of the 
microgrid organically. This type of microgrid would allow for assured, long term power 
during islanding from the commercial grid.  
In 2012, the Secretary of the Navy mandated that “DON installations must reduce 
vulnerabilities to the electric grid by lowering their energy dependence and integrating 
security technologies which enable greater control of distribution” (Department of the 
Navy, 2012, p. 2). Additionally, the Department of the Navy set forth a goal in 2009 to 
get at least 50 percent of its shore-based energy requirements from alternative sources 
(Department of the Navy, 2011). Alternative energy sources are defined as those from 
non-fossil fuel sources, including renewables as well as nuclear energy (Department of 
the Navy, 2012). A SMR powered microgrid is aligned with both of those initiatives.  
For the purpose of our analysis, we focused on recognizing all tangible and 
relevant costs and benefits over the life of the project. The resulting cash flows were then 
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discounted to make a determination of the net present value of the project. Due to the 
complexities of assigning a value to intangible benefits such as added energy security, 
those benefits were not included in the NPV calculation, but were considered as a 
qualitative factor in the results section of our thesis. We also conducted sensitivity 
analysis and discuss the risks of taking on a large scale project of this nature.  
The end goal of the study was to determine if SMRs are a good investment for the 
DOD at this time. Ultimately, the study highlights the need for assured power for DOD 
installations even if SMRs are not the best option, leaving open the opportunity for 
further research of other viable alternatives.  
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II. SMALL MODULAR NUCLEAR REACTORS (SMRs) 
Utilization of nuclear energy for electricity generation dates back to the early 
years following World War II. Commercial nuclear investments tend to be volatile based 
on public perception of the dangers and risks involved with nuclear power. Military 
applications, however, including ship propulsion, have an extremely low accident rate 
compared to commercial generation. Accidents at nuclear power plants like Chernobyl, 
Three Mile Island and more recently Fukushima drive these perceptions. Traditional 
commercial nuclear reactors are water cooled and use water as the working fluid. The 
water is heated in the nuclear core and turned into steam, which runs through a turbine to 
spin a generator to generate electricity.  
In the early development of nuclear reactors, small systems were the norm. For 
the application of naval propulsion, the output requirements for ships and submarines 
were well within the range now referred to as “small.” Development of relatively small 
systems for commercial power generation, generally relying on technology developed for 
naval propulsion, was carried out in the 1950s. In fact, the first commercial power 
reactor, the Shippingport Nuclear Power Station, was designed by the Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation in cooperation with the Division of Naval Reactors of the Atomic 
Energy Commission (The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, n.d.). 
The thinking at the time was a smaller design would be more cost effective than a 
larger one. Power companies soon discovered that even with a smaller design, 
construction costs remained high and small nuclear plants couldn’t compete with coal 
power plants on a price per MWh of power produced basis (Ramana, 2015). Hence, 
nuclear power plants in the last ~60 years have been built on a very large scale to supply 
many customers from one plant. Power companies did this to achieve economies of scale 
and recover their high construction costs. In recent years, many traditional large nuclear 
plants, with capacities of 1,000 MWe or greater, have faced cost overruns, which is one 
reason why the feasibility of SMRs is being revisited. By convention, SMR plants have a 
capacity of 300MWe or less.  
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One way companies feel they can cut costs of SMRs compared to large reactors is 
through factory production. An SMR can be small enough to be produced in a factory and 
then shipped by rail, water barge or even truck to its destination. Even larger SMRs can 
be fabricated at the factory and the major components assembled at the generation site. 
As SMR technology continues to mature and other countries start to utilize them, costs 
should decline in accordance with manufacturing scale. 
Today’s SMR designs have robust safety features, which require a minimal 
number of operators. SMRs also have the ability to be operated in clusters to support 
energy needs of a grid with high MW requirements. Their flexibility would allow a 
military base’s microgrid to be powered with just one SMR for smaller installations or 
using a cluster of SMRs for larger ones. Multiple countries are pursuing SMR technology 
beyond the United States, including Russia, Japan, France, India, Argentina, South Korea 
and China (D. Ingersoll, 2009). SMRs have a promising future in the sustainment of the 
electrical grid across the globe. 
A. TYPES OF SMRs 
SMR designs consist of three main categories based upon the coolant method 
used. Pressurized water reactors (PWR), gas cooled rectors, and fast reactors, which are 
cooled by liquid metal such as lead or sodium (Hsu, Wu, & Lin, 2013). Multiple 
companies have designs for PWR SMRs. Traditional large nuclear plants utilize water as 
a coolant, so companies leveraged their experience in PWR technology to design and 
build such systems to a smaller scale. The last commercial gas cooled reactor built in the 
United States was located at Fort St. Vrain in Platteville, Colorado. The plant began 
operation in 1979 and shutdown in 1989 (D. Ingersoll, 2009). Research and development 
continues with gas cooled SMRs, but recent interest lies mostly in liquid metal cooled 
reactors and PWRs. While all three coolant methods can be designed around the SMR 
concept and achieve the advantage of compact size, the liquid metal cooled reactors have 
an added advantage. Due to rapid development of nuclear power between 1960 and 1970 
concerns were raised of depleting uranium supplies across the globe. Liquid-metal-cooled  
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fast reactors (LMFR) are able to produce more fuel than they consume (D. Ingersoll, 
2009). A major negative of LMFR concepts is that they generate a significant amount of 
plutonium, which can be concerning because plutonium can be weaponized. Many 
countries are concerned about expanding nuclear energy so much that plutonium could 
become a common commodity and may fall into the wrong hands.  
B. COMPANIES 
Multiple companies have designs for SMRs and some have submitted these 
designs for approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This discussion of 
companies is not all inclusive, it simply highlights a few of the major ones in the 
industry. NuScale, one of the industry leaders, submitted a design to NRC for review. 
Their design is for a PWR reactor with an output of 50MWe, which can be clustered with 
up to twelve modules making a total output of 600MWe. NuScale has also been approved 
for siting of their SMR on Idaho’s National Laboratory (Conca, 2017).  
Westinghouse is another major competitor in SMRs. They have a design for a 
PWR which has an output of 225MWe. Westinghouse also advertises the ability for their 
SMR to be placed underground, alleviating some risks from weather and EMP attacks 
(Westinghouse Corp., n.d.). They are also working on a lead cooled fast reactor design 
but have not released specifications of that design yet. However, due to cost overruns of 
two large nuclear reactors in the United States, Westinghouse Electric, a subsidiary of 
Toshiba, has filed for bankruptcy (Pham, 2017). At this time, Westinghouse’s future 
investment in advanced SMRs is unclear. 
A company which does hold a design for a lead cooled reactor is LeadCold. Their 
design named the Swedish Advanced Lead Cooled Reactor (SEALER) has a core life 
between 10–30 years and has on output range from 3–10MWe (LeadCold, 2017). 
Leadcold estimates that they can deliver the SEALER reactor at a cost of 100 million 
Canadian dollars which converts to around 80 million U.S. dollars (2017). Leadcold 
submitted their design in 2016 to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission for approval 
(LeadCold, 2017).  
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There are a number of companies competing for their SMRs to be adopted by 
industry. For the purpose of this paper, the cost analysis focused on NuScale’s design in 
part because we are considering the idea of having nuclear trained sailors operate these 
reactors during their shore duty, which cuts down on operational costs. Sailors currently 
operate water cooled SMRs for propulsion of aircraft carriers and submarines, so utilizing 
NuScale’s water cooled design may reduce the need for additional training. The days of 
large scale LWRs appears to be behind us, and the era of SMRs may well be the future in 
the nuclear industry. 
C. MERITS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
1. Reduced Greenhouse Gases 
There is a growing concern related to climate change due to greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Scientists have been studying the effects of GHG on climate change 
for some time now and recently the public has realized this concern not only through 
scientific studies but also through the continuous political drumbeat to reduce GHG. 
During President Obama’s campaign in 2008, he set a goal of reducing total GHG 
emission for the United States by 80% by 2050. If this goal is achieved, it will be our 
lowest GHG emissions in the United States since 1906 (D. Ingersoll, 2016, p. 11). Coal is 
the largest contributor of GHG today with natural gas not far behind. Multiple studies 
have found nuclear to be similar to hydro, wind and solar to the extent that they emit 
essentially no GHG (D. Ingersoll, 2016, p. 9). However, when people talk about GHG 
reduction, they tend to only discuss wind and solar energy expansion. Nuclear energy can 
be even more effective given its long history as long as the proper safety measures are 
included in the design. In 2016, the United States generated 34.6% of its electricity from 
non GHG emitting sources. Of that percentage, 57% was nuclear generation the rest was 
wind (16.2%), biomass (4.3%), solar and geothermal (EIA, 2017c). Nuclear as a 
percentage of non-GHG emitting sources is by far the largest portion. Nuclear power can 
help not only the military but other countries combat climate change through reduced 
GHG emissions.  
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2. Safety 
In over 60 years of commercial nuclear power generation, while a number of 
smaller accidents have taken place, there have been only the three previously mentioned 
major accidents: Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and more recently Fukushima. The history 
of commercial nuclear power generation over that span accounts for 17,000 cumulative 
reactor hours in 33 countries (World Nuclear Association, 2016). The International 
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is a tool designed to quickly and easily 
communicate to the media and public the significance of a safety event within the civil 
nuclear industry. The scale, developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD/NEA), ranks safety events on a scale from 1–7, level 1–3 being 
“incidents” and level 4–7 being “accidents,” with level 7 being the most severe (major 
accident) (Interational Atomic Energy Agency, 2016). According to a 2014 study by Ha-
Duong and Journé, there have been 13 accidents of INES level 4 or greater at nuclear 
power reactors worldwide. Of those, two were rated INES level 7, Chernobyl and 
Fukushima, occurring in 1986 and 2011 respectively (Ha-Duong & Journé, 2014). 
While regulation and increased technology are making nuclear power safer today 
than it was in the past, SMRs come with some increased safety margins over large 
nuclear power plants. NuScale’s PWR reactor boasts many passive safety systems meant 
to safely cool the reactor with no operator intervention, AC or DC power, or additional 
water (NuScale Power, 2017). The NRC notes that SMR designs with smaller cores and 
passive safety features may result in the calculation of smaller source term/releases 
following an accident. In the future, the increased safety features of SMRs could lead to 
increased margins of safety, but also to siting SMRs closer to population centers than 
previously allowed for large nuclear reactors (McCree, 2016). 
As previously mentioned, nuclear trained sailors could be utilized to operate these 
shored-based SMRs. The safety record of operating nuclear power plants on submarines 
and aircraft carriers is impeccable. The Navy has been using nuclear reactors for 
propulsion since 1954. “The Nuclear Navy has logged over 5,400 reactor years of 
accident-free operations and travelled over 130 million miles on nuclear energy, enough 
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to circle the earth 3,200 times” (Conca, 2014, para. 5). A reactor year is defined as the 
operation of a reactor core for one year. The Navy puts a high emphasis on nuclear 
training and safety, rightfully so, given the inherent risk of operating them at sea. The 
added safety features in the SMR design and the safety record of the operators reduces 




For the business case analysis of SMRs, we looked specifically at a microgrid 
construct including three major installations, Naval Base San Diego (NBSD), Naval Base 
Point Loma (NBPL), and Naval Base Coronado (NBC). Figure 1 displays an aerial view 
of the three installations. San Diego is one of the largest fleet concentration areas in the 
United States. This analysis can be extrapolated and applied to microgrids of similar size 
and electrical demand or scaled down for the demands of smaller bases. The analysis 
consists of a number of assumptions because the latest SMR technology lacks a proof of 
concept. This requires that we make assumptions about inputs rather than injecting 
concrete data from all sources. 
  
Figure 1.  Aerial view of NBSD, NBC, and NBPL. Source: 
Meagher (2016). 
A. DATA INPUTS 
For the analysis, we used construction cost estimates, operation and maintenance 
cost estimates, refueling estimates, expected cash flow and current base consumption. 
NuScale provides publicly available construction cost estimates through their website. 
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We are not considering whether land is available for the SMR or if it would be built off 
site. We assumed the SMR would be built locally which makes the cost of added 
transmission infrastructure negligible. This assumption may not be true for all bases, 
especially ones located in densely populated areas.  This would most likely be the case 
for bases in the more remote areas around the country. Historical data for large nuclear 
reactors provided O&M refueling cost estimates. 
Using monthly energy consumption and peak demand data of the three 
installations for FY2016 allowed us to determine the size for the SMR plant to be built. 
We sought to analyze an SMR plant that would be capable of providing all the bases’ 
needs during normal operations, making it a self-sufficient microgrid. The connection to 
the commercial grid would not be severed except in the case of a grid disruption or 
routine testing. The macrogrid would provide power as necessary during peak demand 
and SMR maintenance. This also has the benefit of additional redundancy. For the cash 
flow portion of the analysis, we considered cost savings by not paying for commercial 
power based on the actual cost of electricity in FY2016.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
Inherent uncertainty exists with any long-term capital project, which leads to a 
number of assumptions listed below; especially when dealing with a first-of-a-kind 
technology project. 
1. The SMR facility would be built on government owned land. 
2. The costs incurred for O&M and refueling will remain constant (in real 
dollars) over the life of the project. This is because we are using a real 
discount rate vice nominal, a real discount rate takes long term inflation 
into account. 
3. Regulatory expenses will be a transfer from one government agency to 
another, so it will not be included in the net present value calculation. 
4. Discount rate will be nominal at 2.8% based on a 30-year treasury note.  
Assuming long-term inflation at 2.0% this comes out to a real discount 
rate of 0.8%. 
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5. Cash flow from selling excess capacity will be based on average consumer 
price $/MWh as calculated by the EIA taking into account future projected 
rates. 
6. There will be a zero sum for increased consumption. The installations 
connected by the microgrid will have constant consumption in terms of 
average MWh used from the SMR. Over the life of the SMR, more end 
users may be pulling from the capacity of the SMR, but this is expected to 
be offset by increased efficiency and technology improvements. 
7. The cost of added T&D and hardware needed to establish the microgrid is 
negligible relative to the capital investment in the project. 
C. NOMINAL VERSUS REAL DOLLARS 
The buying power of a dollar changes overtime. A nominal dollar implies that it is 
not adjusted for inflation. “In order to control for the declining purchasing power of a 
dollar due to inflation, we convert nominal dollars into real dollars (sometimes called 
constant dollars) (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer, 2006).”  To convert from 
nominal to real dollars simply subtract the effect of inflation.  Whether a particular 
analysis uses nominal or real dollar values does not change the end result, as long as the 
values remain consistent throughout. 
The cash flows in our analysis remain constant for each period.  The only cash 
flow which changed each period was the electricity cost savings.  This value was adjusted 
for expected increases in electricity costs published by the EIA and not due to inflation.  
The other input values remain constant because we are not adding the effect of expected 
inflation.  To account for this, we adjusted the discount rate.  Since all dollar values are 
presented in constant or real dollars, we used a real discount rate.  The real discount rate 
is simply the nominal discount rate minus the expected inflation rate.   
D. CALCULATIONS 
With all the cost and cash flow estimates compiled, a Net Present Value (NPV) 
calculation can be conducted. Corporations use NPV calculations when deciding whether 
to make an investment in a new long-term asset. The calculation takes into account the 
cash outflow and the expected cash inflows (net cash flows) for each period over the life 
of the asset. One year defines a period in the calculation. These cash flows are discounted 
 18
back to present value so the cash flow generated in future periods is measured equally 
against cash outflows for the initial investment. Generally, a negative NPV indicates not 
to make the investment. While a positive NPV signals a potential good investment, 
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The numerator consists of the net cash flow for a given period. The discount rate 
takes into account the time value of money. Time value of money concept indicates that a 
dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. The discount rate accounts for 
whether an investor would obtain a better return on investment by investing the money 
elsewhere. Government investments use discount rates based on Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) guidance. We utilized a real discount rate of 0.8% based on the latest 
OMB directive (Office of Management and Budget, 2017). 
The results from the NPV calculation can help decision makers decide whether or 
not to make an investment. However, other factors should be taken under consideration. 
These factors include, politics, public acquiescence, and intangible benefits. It is 
important to reiterate that our calculations only take into account explicit costs. Other 
possible benefits such as energy security should also go into the calculus when making a 
final decision. 
E. LEVELIZED COST OF ELECTRICITY 
Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is a common metric used in the private 
sector when deciding to invest in a certain electricity source. LCOE compares the life 
cycle cost of different plants such as coal, natural gas, nuclear, solar or wind. It discounts 
the total cost over the life of a project into today’s dollars for a one-to-one comparison. 
LCOE accounts for capital costs, O&M costs and fuel costs over the life of a plant. 
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LCOE is typically in units of $/MWh. The EIA annually publishes updated LCOE 
estimates for a variety of electricity generating sources. 
This study does not use LCOE as a direct metric in the analysis because the EIA 
bases their calculations on numbers which apply to a private investor in the utility 
market. For example, the EIA uses weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for such an 
investment at a real after tax of rate 5.5% assuming a 30-year cost recovery period 
(EIA, 2017a). The WACC can be approximated as the discount rate but for this analysis, 
we use a discount rate based on a 30-year treasury note. Therefore, the EIA’s LCOE 
estimate for advanced nuclear generation, for plants coming online in 2022 is 
$96.2/MWh, overstates the cost of capital for a government investment (EIA, 2017a). 
This estimate may work well for a private investor’s comparison purposes. It does not 
directly translate to the government’s investment in a capital project. 
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IV. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INVESTMENT 
An investment in a nuclear reactor requires the consideration of a number of 
different costs. The basic cost categories remain the same regardless of the size of the 
plant. The costs include construction, operation and maintenance (O&M), and refueling 
costs. A commercial utility would also incur the additional costs of property taxes and 
regulatory fees. We did not consider taxes because the SMR is assumed to be on 
government property. The initial regulatory costs associated with SMR design licensing 
are included in the initial price.  Further regulatory fees over the life of the SMR are 
treated as an internal transfer within the government. When conducting an analysis of any 
long-term investment, it is important to consider the costs over the life of the project and 
not just the initial construction costs. 
A. CONSTRUCTION COST 
Construction or capital costs account for the largest percentage of the total life 
cycle, typically over 50%. In the nuclear industry, construction costs are commonly 
referred to as “overnight costs.” NuScale published comprehensive overnight cost 
estimates for their 12 module SMR in 2015 as shown in Figure 3. They estimate that for a 
full 12 module plant it would cost just short of three billion dollars (NuScale Power, 
2015). This estimate includes all materials, labor, and necessary support from NuScale. 
They also estimate the construction would take approximately four years. This plant has 
an estimated output of 570MWe, which greatly exceeds the demand for even a large 
installation like NBSD. For this analysis, we considered the overnight cost of a two 
module plant with an output of 95MWe.  
Historically, cost overruns have had a negative impact on the nuclear industry. 
Two large reactors were expected to come online in South Caroline and Georgia in 2021, 
with a cost estimate of approximately 11.5 billion dollars each (Plumer, 2017). Both 
projects have hit construction delays and more than doubled in cost to estimates of over 
25 billion dollars (Plumer, 2017). These projects may face abandonment as a result. High 
construction costs and the risk of additional cost overruns bring about a large degree of 
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uncertainty when investing in this type of capital intensive project.  Due to this 
uncertainty, we revisit construction cost estimates in the sensitivity analysis.  
B. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
O&M costs account for approximately one quarter of the total life cycle cost. A 
large percentage of the O&M costs are attributed to both corrective and preventative 
maintenance. A nuclear plant has many components other than the core itself. These 
include pumps, pipes, valves, and steam turbines. The replacement of these various 
components over the life of the plant is what makes O&M expensive. The labor of the 
operators is an additional expense, and one that could be reduced by having nuclear 
Sailors operate the plant. This factor however, would not significantly reduce total O&M. 
It is important to note here that utilizing nuclear trained sailors reduces operational costs 
but does not make the labor cost of operations “free.” If the SMR technology is adopted 
throughout multiple DOD installations, an increase in manning would likely be 
necessary.  
In this analysis, we accounted for O&M on an annual basis to properly discount it 
into today’s dollars over the life of the plant. O&M costs are not incurred until 
construction of the plant is completed in year four. The average cost for O&M of Nuclear 
Plants in the United States in 2016 was $20.43 per MWh of capacity (Nuclear Energy 
Institute, 2017). The following calculations illustrate the annual O&M cost: 
Annual MWh capacity = (95 )*(8760 )  832,200
$20.43Annual O&M cost = (832,200 )*( )  $17,001,800






For this analysis, O&M costs were held constant over the life of the project. O&M 
costs of nuclear plants are typically proprietary information. Thus, historical data is not 
readily available on how these costs vary over the life of a plant. For this reason, we 
chose to hold O&M costs constant over the life of the project.   
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C. FUEL COSTS 
Fuel costs are the last major factor in the life cycle cost of a plant. While a plant 
can operate for up to 60 years before decommissioning, it still requires refueling of the 
core. NuScale estimates refueling for a given module would be required every two to four 
years, depending on its output compared to capacity. If the plant operates at capacity a 
majority of the time, the plant would require refueling every two years because fuel is 
consumed at a faster rate. Refueling costs can fluctuate over the life of a reactor based on 
the cost of Uranium at the time of refueling. For the analysis, we assumed refueling 
occurs every two years with the same cost incurred each time. While this assumption may 
not hold true over the life of the plant, it is a good starting point due to the historical 
volatility of Uranium prices. Figure 2 depicts the price volatility of Uranium from 1948 
to 2013 and is a good illustration of why predicting future Uranium prices is nearly 
impossible. Similar to O&M, this cost is incurred after construction is complete and the 
plant is operational. The overnight price includes the initial fuel, and the project incurs 
refueling costs annually thereafter. The average refueling cost for a U.S. nuclear plant in 
2016 was $6.76 per MWh of capacity (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2017). The following 
calculation illustrates the annual fuel costs: 
 $6.76Annual Fuel Cost = (832,200 )*( )  $5,625,670MWh year MWh    
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Figure 2.  Uranium price volatility 1948–2013. Source: Ganda (2014). 
The different periods in Figure 2 represent distinctive eras of nuclear power 
generation. How each period is defined is not important here, just note the volatility of 
Uranium prices. The blue line is Separative Work Unit, defined as the price to enrich the 
Uranium and convert it to usable nuclear fuel (Ganda, 2014). 
D. NUSCALE COST ESTIMATES 
NuScale has published comprehensive cost estimates for their 12-module 570 
MWe capacity SMR plant. Figure 3 outlines the overnight cost in 2014 dollars. This cost 
summary accounts for the capital cost of the investment, not the O&M and refueling 
costs to operate the plant throughout its life cycle. The acronym EPC stands for 
engineering, procurement, and construction. 
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Figure 3.  NuScale cost estimate for a 570 MWe plant. Source:  
NuScale Power (2015). 
To further explain Figure 3 by line item, the first item is the reactor modules 
themselves. These modules would be factory assembled and shipped to the construction 
site. Home office and engineering support includes the required support from NuScale 
regarding design progress and any changes to configuration that may occur. Site 
infrastructure includes the initial set up of the site to include tree clearing, leveling out of 
the land and any additional modifications required to construct the plant on the site. The 
nuclear island houses the reactor vessels onsite. RXB is the reactor building, RWB is the 
reactor waste building, and MCR is the main control room where the operators monitor 
and operate the plant. The turbine island includes the turbines for electricity generation 
and the buildings which house them. Balance of plant includes all the components used to 
maintain the reactor within parameters of temperature, pressure and output. Cooling 
towers, pumps, valves and piping are all components included in balance of plant. 
Distributables include items which NuScale would have to have onsite for continued 
support of construction operations. Finally, other costs include regulatory costs such as 
those incurred obtaining a license design certification from the NRC. 
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Tailored Costs for a San Diego Microgrid 
A 570MWe plant would greatly exceed the demand of the proposed three-
installation microgrid. The modular design of the NuScale plant allows customers to 
scale down. For the San Diego microgrid, investment in a two-module plant makes much 
more sense. A two-module plant would have a capacity of 95 MWe, with each module 
having 50MWe output and a 95% capacity factor (NuScale Power, 2015). NuScale has 
not published estimates for a smaller plant. They believe most private investors would opt 
for the larger 12 module plant to achieve better economies of scale. Table 1 shows an 
estimate for a two module plant in 2017 dollars, using a cumulative inflation rate of 3.7% 
(“U.S. Inflation Calculator,” n.d.). A couple of line items have been reduced to account 
for the smaller plant size. The cost of the power modules was reduced by dividing 
NuScale’s quoted power module cost by 12 and multiplying by two. The same 
calculation was made for the turbine island line item because two modules only require 
two turbines, one per module. The bulk of the cost of the turbine island line item is 
assumed to be for the turbines and not the building to house them. The remaining line 
items are unchanged from the 12 module estimate. Some of these costs may be reduced 
due to the plants smaller size, but as a conservative estimate they were left unchanged. 
Table 1.   NuScale overnight cost estimate for two-module plant 
($1,000,000) 
Item Cost 
Power Modules (FOAK cost plus fee, transportation, site 
assembly) $146.56 
Home Office Engineering and Support $149.33 
Site Infrastructure $62.22 
Nuclear Island $557.91
Turbine Island (2 buildings with 6 turbines each) $60.49 
Balance of Plant (annex, cooling towers, etc.) $233.33 
Distributables (temp. bldgs., field staff, const equip. etc.) $565.17 
Other Costs $191.85 
Total Overnight Price $1,966.84 
Note:  2017 dollars. 
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E. COSTS NOT CONSIDERED 
The SMR would be owned and operated by the DOD.  Therefore there are other 
costs which a private firm would incur that do not apply to the government. These costs 
include those to acquire the land as well as property taxes. These would not be incurred 
due to the assumption that the SMR would be built on U.S. government owned property.  
No additional regulatory fees were considered in the overall cost. At this time, 
NuScale has a design license approval pending with the NRC, and their licensing costs 
are already included in their overnight cost estimate. Other NRC inspection costs and 
annual operating fees were considered an interagency transaction. While these costs 
would be an expenditure for the DOD, they would be revenue for the NRC, thus the 
United States government would see no cash outflow from the treasury. 
Costs of additional T&D and added hardware to establish a secure microgrid was 
not considered. T&D could be significant if the SMR facility were located a great 
distance from the microgrid, however, this analysis assumes the facility would be built on 
government owned land close to or within the military installation. Additionally, the cost 
of the added hardware and software to create a secure microgrid at the San Diego bases 
are insignificant relative to the capital cost of the SMRs (Meagher, 2016). 
F. NET PRESENT VALUE OF COSTS 
The NPV of the costs for the NuScale two module SMR plant is presented in 
Table 2. The construction cost was divided evenly over the four-year construction period. 
The O&M and refueling costs were incurred starting in year five and continued annually 
for the 40 year life of the plant. The NRC typically issues an initial reactor license for 40 
years which can be extended for an additional 20 years (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2015). For this analysis, we assumed a 40-year life of the plant. The costs 
were all discounted at the real rate of 0.8% and the sum of the NPVs came to 2.697 
billion dollars. 
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Table 2.   NPV for the cost of SMR plant ($1,000,000) 
Cost Category Net Present Value 
Construction Cost  ($1,943.55)  
O&M Cost ($566.33)  
Refueling Cost ($187.39)  
Total NPV Cost ($2,697.27) 
Note: 2017 dollars. 
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V. CASH FLOWS AND TOTAL NPV OF SMR INVESTMENT 
The financial benefits or cash flows of an SMR powered microgrid include the 
estimated cost savings on electricity and the potential cash flow generated from selling 
power back to the grid. To estimate the electricity cost savings, we used FY2016 
electrical usage and cost data acquired from Naval Bases San Diego, Coronado, and Point 
Loma provided by Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC SW). Table 3 
depicts the electricity consumption data for the three naval bases by month for FY 2016. 
Table 3.   FY 2016 electricity consumption data for Naval Bases San Diego, 
Coronado, and Point Loma  








Oct 30,647.3 23,757.0 7,384.6 61,788.9
Nov 36,140.6 20,759.9 9,067.9 65,968.4
Dec 26,799.2 15,045.9 6,444.0 48,289.1
Jan 26,612.3 15,428.3 6,614.0 48,654.6
Feb 42,549.1 23,226.0 9,608.9 75,384.0
Mar 33,675.7 18,690.2 6,897.4 59,263.3
Apr 32,570.9 17,016.5 6,409.0 55,996.4
May 40,866.7 23,505.0 7,712.7 72,084.4
Jun 30,216.6 19,400.7 6,241.5 55,858.8
Jul 25,929.3 16,714.5 6,939.9 49,583.7
Aug 31,035.0 21,034.8 8,473.7 60,543.5
Sep 21,881.4 14,245.7 6,690.9 42,818.0
FY2016 
Total 
378,924.3 228,824.7 88,484.6 696,233.6
Adapted from unpublished data provided by NAVFAC SW. 
 
As previously stated, a two-module NuScale SMR operating at a 95% capacity 
factor would have a total capacity of 95 MWe. To determine the total monthly capacity, 
we multiplied the total MWe output of the system by the number of hours in a day and 
the number of days in each month. The expected total monthly capacity and the three 
installations combined monthly electricity demand is shown in Table 4. By comparing 
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the monthly SMR capacity figures to the FY 2016 consumption data, we assess that the 
SMR provided power would have met demand in all months except for February and 
May.   
Table 4.   Expected total monthly capacity of a two-module NuScale SMR 
plant and the expected demand of the three-installation microgrid  
Month SMR capacity 
(MWh) 
FY 2016 total electricity demand 
of the three installation microgrid 
(MWh) 
Oct 70,680.0 61,788.9 
Nov 68,400.0 65,968.4 
Dec 70,680.0 48,289.1 
Jan 70,680.0 48,654.6 
Feb 66,120.0 75,384.0 
Mar 68,400.0 59,263.3 
Apr 68,400.0 55,996.4 
May 70,680.0 72,084.4 
Jun 68,400.0 55,858.8 
Jul 70,680.0 49,583.7 
Aug 70,680.0 60,543.5 
Sep 68,400.0 42,818.0 
Annual 832,200.0 696,233.6 
Adapted from unpublished data provided by NAVFAC SW. 
 
One variable not considered in Table 4 is instantaneous peak demand. According 
to data provided by NAVFAC SW on the individual monthly peak demand of each of the 
three installations, a 95 MWe plant would have been sufficient to meet peak demand in 7 
of the 12 months (NAVFAC SW, unpublished data). This is a conservative estimate 
because peak demand may not occur at each installation at the same time.  
A. ESTIMATING ELECTRICITY COST SAVINGS 
Future estimated cost savings on electricity are considered a positive cash flow for 
the life of the project. In order to determine those cost savings, we estimated the total 
electricity in MWh that would be provided by the SMR rather than the utility. This 
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involved looking at not only the total electricity consumed by the microgrid, but also the 
peak demand for the microgrid. Analyzing the FY 2016 electricity consumption data for 
the potential microgrid, we found three scenarios: 
1. The SMR is able to meet monthly demand as well as peak demand. 
2. The SMR is able to meet monthly demand but not peak demand. 
3. The SMR is unable to meet monthly or peak demand. 
In scenario 1, we estimated that all electricity demands of the microgrid would be 
met by the SMR. In scenario 2, we estimated that the SMR would be able to provide 95% 
of the monthly electricity demand of the microgrid. Therefore the cost savings achieved 
are assumed to be 95% of the microgrids expected electricity demand.  The following 
calculation is for cost savings based on the month of January 2016: 
Monthly cost savings = (Monthly  electricity demand)*(E lectricity rate)*(.95)
 
$73.59January 2016 savings = (48,654.6 )*( )*(.95)  $3,401,657MWh MWh 
 
In scenario 3, we estimated that the SMR would be able to provide 95% of the plant’s 
capacity to the microgrid.  This equates to a 95% utilization rate for the 95 MWe capacity 
of the reactor. The following calculation is for cost savings based on the month of 
February 2016: 
Monthly cost savings = (Monthly  SMR capacity)*(E lectricity rate)*(.95)
 
$72.12February 2016 savings = (66,120 )*( )*(.95)  $4,530,151MWh MWh 
 
Table 5 shows the estimated annual savings that would have been achieved by the 




Table 5.   Estimated savings of the SMR-powered microgrid 
Month SMR produced electricity 
consumed (MWh) 
FY 2016 average 
cost per MWh 
Estimated savings of an 
SMR powered microgrid in 
FY 2016 ($1,000) 
Oct 61,788.94 $83.20 $5,140.8
Nov 65,968.44 $77.83 $5,134.5
Dec 48,289.14 $70.32 $3,395.7
Jan 46,221.91 $73.59 $3,401.7
Feb 62,814.00 $72.12 $4,530.2
Mar 56,300.17 $75.34 $4,241.9
Apr 53,196.62 $69.74 $3,709.7
May 67,146.00 $84.75 $5,690.8
Jun 55,858.84 $96.30 $5,379.0
Jul 49,583.74 $101.42 $5,028.9
Aug 60,543.54 $91.15 $5,518.3
Sep 42,818.04 $90.33 $3,867.9
Annual 670,529.39 $82.08 1 $55,039.6
1 Weighted average cost of electricity for the three installation in FY 2016. 
Adapted from unpublished data provided by NAVFAC SW. 
Note:  2016 dollars. 
 
In order to estimate the cost savings of future electricity costs, we first adjusted 
the 2016 value for inflation at a rate of 2.8% to put it in 2017 dollars (“U.S. Inflation 
Calculator,” n.d.). We then estimated the future cost of electricity for each year over the 
life of the project. The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2017 projects a 0.4% annual increase 
in U.S. electricity prices in real dollars per kWh through year 2050 (EIA, 2017b). This 
estimate of the growth of electricity prices is an all sector average projection for the 
United States. For estimated future electricity cost savings, we applied this predicted 
growth rate to the calculated savings annually over the life of the project. The electricity 
cost savings were discounted at the real rate of 0.8% over the life of the projected 44 year 
project. The NPV of those savings came out to 2.063 billion dollars. 
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B. ESTIMATING CASH FLOW FROM THE SALE OF ELECTRICITY 
There are several ways a utility customer can generate savings through the sale of 
electricity back to the grid. The first is known as Net Energy Metering (NEM). San Diego 
Gas and Electric’s (SDG&E) NEM program allows a customer to earn bill credits at 
times when there is a flow of excess electricity that is generated above what is consumed 
by the customer (San Diego Gas & Electric [SDG&E], n.d.-a). However, NEM is 
reserved for customers with renewable energy generation that does not include nuclear 
power.  
A second way a utility customer can generate cash flow is through a purchase and 
sale agreement with the utility. The customer pays retail prices for electricity consumed 
from the utility and is typically compensated at wholesale prices by the utility for excess 
generation that is fed back into the grid.  
A third way a utility customer can generate cash flow is by participating in 
Demand Response (DR) programs. This is when a utility offers financial incentives to 
customers in exchange for a reduction in electricity consumption from the grid during 
times of peak demand or grid congestion (SDG&E, n.d.-b).  
For the purpose of our initial NPV calculation, we chose not to include any cash 
flows from the sale of electricity back to the grid. There are several reasons for this. First, 
it would be very difficult to determine how much electricity the microgrid could provide 
to the larger macrogrid without detailed modeling of the microgrid’s electricity 
consumption. Second, wholesale rates that utilities will pay for excess generation vary 
substantially by season and time of use. This makes determining a reliable cash flow 
from a project like this very difficult. Lastly, NuScale’s SMR design gives it a unique 
ability to load follow based on customer demand as well as its integration with 
intermittent renewables (Marcinkiewicz, 2017). This technology, known as NuFollow, is 
based on the plants ability to adjust the power output from one or more modules as well 
as bypassing turbine steam to the condenser (Marcinkiewicz, 2017). 
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While we chose not to use the sale of electricity back to the grid for the purpose 
of making our initial determination of the projects NPV, we did revisit the subject in our 
sensitivity analysis. We also believe this subject is a good candidate for future study.  
C.   NPV OF A NUSCALE SMR INVESTMENT 
The total NPV of the proposed investment into a NuScale SMR powered 
microgrid is displayed in Table 6. The entire spreadsheet of annual cash flows is depicted 
in the appendix.   
Table 6.   Estimated total NPV of the project ($1,000,000) 
  Net Present Value 
Construction Cost  ($1,943,552,174)
O&M Cost ($529,985,994)
Refueling Cost ($175,365,332)




Total NPV of Project  ($641,572,514)
Note: 2017 dollars. 
 
D. VALUING ENERGY SECURITY 
The primary and potentially most valuable intangible benefit that we did not 
monetize for the purpose of this business case analysis is that of added energy security. 
With our base case NPV analysis complete, we were able to drive the project NPV to 0 or 
at a break-even point by assuming a PV of 633.7 million dollars for the added energy 
security provided by the project. To put this into better perspective, this would equate to a 
monetized PV cash flow of approximately 19.03 million dollars annually over the 40 year 
life of the plant. Put more simply, if decision makers were to value the added energy 
security for the three installations at more than 19.03 million dollars annually, the NPV 
would become positive. This break-even value for energy security, although a good 
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starting point, is not useful without some estimate for what the DOD should pay for 
energy security.  
 In 2013, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) published a study on placing a 
monetary value on energy security at the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (DASN) for Energy. The method illustrated in the study placed a value on energy 
security provided by a project through the use of the “least-cost” method (Ackerman & 
Carvel, 2013). The “least cost” method places a value on the electricity capacity provided 
by an alternative energy project equal to the cost of providing that same amount of 
capacity through diesel backup generators.   
In 2012, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conducted a study 
describing the Customer Damage Function (CDF) as a method for valuing energy 
security (Giraldez, J., Booth, S., Anderson, K., & Massey, K., 2012).  The report included 
case studies at two DOD installations, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar and Army Base 
Fort Belvoir.  The site-specific data, obtained through a site survey included:  loss of 
productivity, equipment damage, food spoilage, backup generator fuel usage, the cost of 
human lives put at risk, and the cost to restart equipment.  The authors monetized these 
parameters to plot the CDF function in $/kWe peak demand as a function of outage 
duration.  Once the CDF was determined, the Value of Electrical Energy Security 
(VEES) was calculated by multiplying the average duration of outages annually by the 
value of the CDF and peak demand (kWe).  The study highlighted that energy security 
valuation is location dependent and not universal across the country (Giraldez et al., 
2012).   
We chose to apply the “least-cost” method to estimate upper and lower bounds for 
the value of increased energy security for the proposed project.  This method is more 
easily applied than the CDF method which requires very site specific data which we did 
not have access to.  
The CNA’s studying on valuing energy security defined “energy security or 
electrical security as the ability of military installations to obtain electric power when 
service from the national grid is disrupted.” (Ackerman & Carvel, 2013, p. 7) The value 
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is derived from the cost of producing that same amount of electricity through the use of 
diesel backup generators which are most commonly used by DOD facilities to protect 
against power outages. The authors estimated the average total annualized cost of diesel 
backup generators at $49.43 per kW of capacity in 2013 dollars. This cost included not 
only the initial generator cost, but also sustainment costs, a reliability adjustment, fuel 
costs, fuel storage costs, and fuel storage tank sustainment costs (Ackerman & Carvel, 
2013).  Adjusting this value for inflation, we arrived at a value $52.34 per kW in 2017 
dollars (“U.S. Inflation Calculator,” n.d.). The CNA study also accounted for geographic 
cost factors at various Department of the Navy (DON) locations.  The cost factor for the 
San Diego area installations cited by the study was 1.16 (Ackerman & Carvel, 2013). 
The following calculation was used to value the energy security provided by the 
SMR plant using the “least-cost” method:    
Annualized energy security value = (SMR capacity)*(least -cost)*(area  cost factor)
 
$52.34Annualized energy security value = (95,000 )*( )*(1.16)  $5,767,868kW kW   
The value of 5.77 million dollars annually for the energy security provided by the 
SMR plant is an upper bound estimate using the “least-cost” method.  This is because the 
entire capacity of the plant may not be needed when the macrogrid is off line.  The lower 
bound can be determined by valuing the electricity provided by the project only up to the 
amount of capacity provided by backup generators already in place at the three 
installations. As Ackerman pointed out:  “One way to think about how DON currently 
values energy security is to estimate the extra dollar amount spent because energy is not 
fully secure.” (Ackerman & Carvel, 2013, p. 27) This lower bound calculation attempts 
to determine only what amount is currently being spent on energy security at the three 
installations.     
The CNA study published data received from NAVFAC on the number of backup 
generators and their capacities for Naval Bases San Diego, Coronado, and Point Loma.  
This data is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7.   2013 NAVFAC reported backup generators by installation 





1 Estimated capacity. 
Adapted from Ackerman & Carvel, 2013. 
 
The following calculation is an estimate of what is currently being spent at the 
three DON installations and is therefore a lower bound estimate for the value of 
additional energy security provided by the project:  
Annualized energy security value = (backup  generator capacity)*(least -cost)*(area  cost factor)
 
$52.34Annualized energy security value = (11,700 )*( )*(1.16)  $710,358kW kW   
 Using Ackerman’s “least-cost” method for valuing energy security we arrived at a 
lower bound of 710 thousand dollars and an upper bound of 5.77 million dollars annually. 
Both of these values are well below the break-even value for energy security of 19.03 
million dollars annually. 
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VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In the previous two chapters, we estimated a reference value for the NPV of the 
proposed investment. Due to the risks involved with a large scale capital intensive 
investment with a forty plus year life span, there are many uncertainties surrounding our 
inputs. Sensitivity analysis gives us the opportunity to adjust our input assumptions to 
acknowledge this uncertainty (Boardman et al., 2006). Three methods available to 
conduct sensitivity analysis include a “Partial Sensitivity Analysis,” a “Worst- and Best-
Case Analysis,” and a “Monte Carlo Analysis.” (Boardman et al., 2006) A “Partial 
Sensitivity Analysis” looks at changing one assumption at a time while holding the others 
constant. A “Worst- and Best-Case Analysis” looks at combining all reasonable worst 
case assumptions and all best case assumptions to arrive at a range. This analysis is useful 
when the base case yields positive net benefits to determine if the NPV would still be 
positive under the worst reasonable assumptions (Boardman et al., 2006). A “Monte 
Carlo Analysis” overcomes some of the limitations of the other two methods by applying 
probability distributions to all uncertain input parameters and then running many 
simulations to arrive at some confidence interval of NPVs (Boardman, et al., 2006). 
While a “Monte Carlo Analysis” is the most comprehensive sensitivity anlayis, it is also 
the most time consuming and technical.   
We chose to conduct a “Partial Sensitivity Analysis” for each input parameter that 
we felt could yield a significant impact to the final NPV. While this method may not 
show us the absolute best or worst case NPV, it allows us to easily determine which input 
parameters have the largest effect on the final NPV. This method also allows us to show 
the value of an input parameter that would drive the projects NPV to zero where 
applicable.  
A. ADJUSTING THE DISCOUNT RATE 
In the reference case, we used a discount rate of 0.8% for the NPV calculations. 
Like most capital intensive projects, much of the costs of the project are in the first few 
years of construction. The benefits are accrued later on, once construction is complete. 
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Therefore, a higher discount rate yields a lower NPV while a lower discount rate yields a 
higher NPV. Keeping all other cost and benefit assumptions equal to our reference case 
analysis, a discount rate of 0.0% would still yield a negative NPV of -383.5 million 
dollars. Any upward adjustment of the discount rate from our reference case of 0.8% 
would lead to a larger negative value than our reference case NPV of -633.8 million 
dollars.   
B. COST OVER-RUNS 
The costs of the investment were broken up into three cost categories: overnight 
costs, refueling, and O&M. Of the three categories, the largest is the overnight cost, 
accounting for over 73% of the total cost. As mentioned previously, the price of Uranium 
has been historically volatile. Consequently, the cost of refueling over the life of the 
project is very unpredictable. However, doubling the annual refueling costs only 
increased the present value of the costs by 7%. Therefore, we chose to look at the 
sensitivity of overnight costs. Table 8 shows the result of doubling the overnight costs. 
This is a conservative estimate based on the latest large nuclear reactor cost overruns in 
South Carolina and Georgia. Both projects experienced delays and cost growth which 
more than doubled from the initial estimates (Proctor, 2017). Doubling the overnight cost 
of construction had a dramatic effect on the overall NPV of the project, driving it to 
approximately -2.6 billion dollars.  
Table 8.   NPV doubling overnight costs ($1,000,000) 
Cost Category Net Present Value 
Construction Cost  ($3,887.1)  
O&M Cost ($566.3)  
Refueling Cost ($187.4)  
NPV of Costs ($4,640.8)  
Electricity Cost Savings $2,063.5 
Project NPV ($2,577.3) 
Note: 2017 dollars. 
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We did not analyze the possibility of a reduction in overnight costs for the plant. 
Historically, large nuclear reactors have experienced significant cost overruns. 
Furthermore, the SMR concept has yet to be commercially demonstrated in the United 
States, so the inherent “first of a kind” risk is likely to increase the probability of cost 
overruns. 
C. ADJUSTING FUTURE ELECTRICITY PRICES 
Higher future electricity costs yield a higher project NPV due to larger future cash 
flows. In the reference case, we estimated the real growth of the price of electricity to be 
0.4% based on the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2017 (EIA, 2017b). The EIA also 
estimated future electricity prices under varying conditions. According to the EIA, the 
factor that had the largest impact on future electricity prices was that of high and low oil 
and gas resource technology. Under the low oil and gas resource technology case, the 
estimated recovery of oil and gas in the United States is assumed to be 50% less than the 
reference case. Additionally, the rate of technological improvement in the U.S. oil and 
gas industry is 50% less than in the reference case. Under this case, the EIAs estimated 
growth of U.S. electricity prices through 2050 is 0.7%. Under the high oil and gas 
resource technology case, the recovery of U.S. oil and gas as well as the rate of 
technological improvement are both 50% greater than in the reference case. Under this 
case, the estimated growth of U.S. electricity prices through 2050 is 0.1% (EIA, 2017b).  
With an estimated 0.7% growth rate for electricity prices, the NPV of the project 
is driven to -486.1 million dollars. With a 0.1% estimated growth rate of electricity 
prices, the NPV of the project is driven to -769.7 million dollars. Finally, the NPV of the 
project can be driven to 0 with an electricity cost growth rate of approximately 1.54%, 
which is well above EIA projections. Figure 4 shows how the projects NPV changes as 
electricity cost growth rate is changed. 
 42
 
Figure 4.   Expected NPV as electricity cost growth changes 
D. ESTIMATING THE SALE OF ELECTRICITY TO THE MACROGRID 
For the reference case, we chose not to include electricity sold to the macrogrid in 
our NPV estimate based on the challenges in doing so noted in Chapter V. However, to 
determine what effect this might have on our final NPV, we chose to do it here. Table 4 
showed the SMR’s monthly capacity along with the anticipated electricity demand based 
off of NAVFAC SW data for electricity consumption for the three installations. In Table 

























Table 9.     Monthly SMR capacity, expected microgrid demand, and 
potential excess electricity 






Oct 70,680.0 61,788.9 8,891.1
Nov 68,400.0 65,968.4 2,431.6
Dec 70,680.0 48,289.1 22,390.9
Jan 70,680.0 48,654.6 22,025.4
Feb 66,120.0 75,384.0 0.0
Mar 68,400.0 59,263.3 9,136.7
Apr 68,400.0 55,996.4 12,403.6
May 70,680.0 72,084.4 0.0
Jun 68,400.0 55,858.8 12,541.2
Jul 70,680.0 49,583.7 21,096.3
Aug 70,680.0 60,543.5 10,136.5
Sep 68,400.0 42,818.0 25,582.0
Annual   146,634.9
Adapted from unpublished data provided by NAVFAC SW. 
 
For a conservative estimate, we assumed that 50% of the potential excess capacity 
would be sold back to the macrogrid at wholesale rates. SDG&E’s average monthly 
wholesale rate for 2016 was $0.02857 per kWh or $28.57 per MWh (SDG&E, 2017). 
Table 10 shows the estimated annual cash flow for the sale of excess capacity back to the 
macrogrid.  
Table 10.    Annual estimates for the sale of electricity back to the macrogrid 
 
Estimated annual excess electricity (MWh) 146,634.9 
Estimated annual electricity sold (MWH) 73,317.4 
Average wholesale rate ($/MWh) $28.57 
Estimated cash flow ($) $2,094,679 




By applying the reference case electricity cost growth rate of 0.4% and adding 
these cash flows to our NPV function, we arrived at a new NPV of -557.1 million. 
Therefore, the sale of electricity back to the macrogrid did not have a significant effect on 
the overall NPV of the project.  
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The NPV analysis results are unfavorable for investment in SMRs by the DOD. 
However, the primary intangible benefit that was excluded from the NPV calculation was 
that of added energy security. Through the “least-cost” method, we were able to provide a 
range for the value of added energy security.  Even at the upper bound value for added 
energy security, the project would still have a negative NPV.  One could argue that the 
“least-cost” method for valuing energy security understates the true value of having 
assured power at DOD installations.  This would be particularly true in times of crises, 
where a military response is critical to national security. It is not difficult to imagine a 
scenario where assured power to critical DOD facilities would far outweigh the 
previously stated break-even point of 19.03 million dollars annually. However, without 
more advanced and complete methods to value energy security, decision makers are left 
with incomplete information to draw from when making decisions on energy 
infrastructure projects. This uncertainty often leads to smaller, incremental improvements 
to energy infrastructure systems rather than large capital intensive projects such as the 
one suggested in this study. 
The main purpose behind our analysis was to show whether the explicit costs and 
benefits would result in a positive NPV. While many of the inputs to the analysis had 
some level of uncertainty, it still provides a base model which can be applied as more 
precise estimates become known. If the decision to invest in SMRs by the DOD were 
strictly a business decision, the negative return would not warrant investment. However, 
the DODs mission is not to provide positive cash flows, but rather to best further national 
security objectives with their allocated budget.      
A. RECOMMENDATION 
The DOD should continue to push initiatives that promote the establishment of 
microgrids for military installations. Microgrids are an essential component to achieving 
improved energy security for shore installations. The energy source portfolio of the 
microgrid should be diversified with renewables and a main “on demand” power source.  
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SMRs should remain under consideration as a viable option to be the main power source 
of a microgrid. The Navy has a favorable history of operating small nuclear reactors and 
SMRs are capable of providing uninterrupted power on a much larger scale than that of 
diesel generators.   
Based on this analysis and the absence of proof of concept SMRs in operation, the 
DOD would be wise to hold off investing in SMR technology. NuScale intends to install 
the first operational SMRs at the Idaho National Laboratory once their design is approved 
by the NRC (Temple, 2017).  The DOD should closely monitor NuScale’s progress 
toward proof of concept and continue to asses SMRs as an option for assured power 
microgrids. As the technology matures and private utilities invest in SMR technology, we 
can expect costs to come down along with the risks associated with investing in a first of 
its kind reactor. While we don’t recommend the DOD initiate an immediate investment in 
a SMR powered microgrid, they should remain under consideration to be the “on-
demand” power source to provide assured power.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several topics which this study touched on which provided areas for 
further research: 
 A full cost benefit analysis (CBA), which takes a detailed approach to 
accounting for intangible benefits such as added energy security. 
 A more comprehensive analysis of a properly diversified energy mix to 
power a DOD installation’s microgrid. 
 An analysis of alternate advanced reactor technology to evaluate their 
potential economic merits as a microgrid’s “on demand” power source. 
  A detailed analysis of the financial benefits of selling excess generated 
electricity from a SMR powered microgrid to the utility.   
 A manpower analysis to further investigate the concept of nuclear trained 
sailors operating SMRs. 
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1. Cost Benefit Analysis 
A full CBA would take into account intangible benefits by monetizing them and 
including them in the NPV calculation. In Chapter V we estimated the value of energy 
security using the “least-cost” method provided by the CNA study on quantifying energy 
security (Ackerman & Carvel, 2013). Other more detailed methods exist to attempt to 
quantify the value of energy security and should be explored further.  If the value of 
energy security and other benefits were found to be significant, it could drive the NPV 
positive, indicating a potentially good investment.  
2. Analysis of a Properly Diversified Energy Mix for a DOD Microgrid 
Taking a more holistic approach to the establishment of a microgrid by analyzing 
the integration of renewable and non-renewable sources would be beneficial. As 
previously stated, some installations have already taken steps toward developing a 
microgrid. Our analysis looked at an SMR plant with the capacity to power the entire 
microgrid. Studying the prospects of a smaller SMR plant supplemented by other energy 
sources may prove to be more viable. This could also incorporate a differentiation 
between critical and non-critical loads. 
3. Analysis of Alternate Advanced Reactor Technologies 
There are a number of different design concepts being researched in advanced 
nuclear technology. Our analysis focused on the NuScale SMR due to the maturity of 
their design relative to others. Other SMR designs are evolving, including liquid metal 
and gas cooled reactors, which may have improved reliability and safety features. As this 
technology matures, other advanced SMR designs warrant a thorough analysis and 
consideration to be a microgrid’s “on demand” power source. 
4. Analysis of Selling a Microgrid’s Excess Generated Electricity 
NEM, electricity purchase and sale agreements, and DR programs provide 
multiple ways for a non-utility electricity provider to generate revenue.  Determining 
these potential cash flows requires detailed modeling of a microgrid’s electricity 
consumption. It would also require a detailed analysis of potential rates that utilities will 
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pay for excess generation which vary substantially by season and time of use. A detailed 
study on the potential benefits of selling excess capacity would be beneficial to any DOD 
microgrid investment decision. 
5. Manpower Analysis for Operating DOD SMRs 
Finally, a manpower analysis to further investigate the prospects of having 
nuclear trained sailors operate DOD SMRs would be important. We mentioned the 
potential of having nuclear trained Sailors operate the plant to reduce O&M costs. A 
manpower analysis could help determine the actual manpower requirements for the 
operation of the plant. This increase in the utilization of nuclear trained Sailors would 
have an unknown impact on current sea-shore rotations for the Navy’s nuclear 
community. Determining the effects of the increased manpower demand would be 
valuable to any decision related to investing in SMR technology. 
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APPENDIX.  REFERENCE CASE NET PRESENT VALUE 
 





Savings Cash Flow Discount Factor PV of cash flows
0 ($491,710,833) $0 $0 $0 ($491,710,833) 1.00000 ($491,710,833)
1 ($491,710,833) $0 $0 $0 ($491,710,833) 0.99206 ($487,808,366)
2 ($491,710,833) $0 $0 $0 ($491,710,833) 0.98419 ($483,936,871)
3 ($491,710,833) $0 $0 $0 ($491,710,833) 0.97638 ($480,096,103)
4 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $57,491,411 $34,863,941 0.96863 $33,770,256
5 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $57,721,377 $35,093,907 0.96094 $33,723,221
6 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $57,952,262 $35,324,792 0.95332 $33,675,684
7 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $58,184,071 $35,556,601 0.94575 $33,627,650
8 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $58,416,807 $35,789,337 0.93824 $33,579,127
9 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $58,650,475 $36,023,005 0.93080 $33,530,123
10 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $58,885,076 $36,257,606 0.92341 $33,480,645
11 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $59,120,617 $36,493,147 0.91608 $33,430,699
12 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $59,357,099 $36,729,629 0.90881 $33,380,294
13 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $59,594,528 $36,967,058 0.90160 $33,329,436
14 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $59,832,906 $37,205,436 0.89444 $33,278,132
15 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $60,072,237 $37,444,767 0.88734 $33,226,390
16 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $60,312,526 $37,685,056 0.88030 $33,174,215
17 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $60,553,776 $37,926,306 0.87332 $33,121,615
18 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $60,795,992 $38,168,522 0.86638 $33,068,596
19 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $61,039,176 $38,411,706 0.85951 $33,015,166
20 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $61,283,332 $38,655,862 0.85269 $32,961,330
21 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $61,528,466 $38,900,996 0.84592 $32,907,095
22 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $61,774,579 $39,147,109 0.83921 $32,852,467
23 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $62,021,678 $39,394,208 0.83255 $32,797,454
24 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $62,269,764 $39,642,294 0.82594 $32,742,061
25 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $62,518,843 $39,891,373 0.81938 $32,686,294
26 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $62,768,919 $40,141,449 0.81288 $32,630,160
27 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $63,019,995 $40,392,525 0.80643 $32,573,665
28 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $63,272,075 $40,644,605 0.80003 $32,516,815
29 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $63,525,163 $40,897,693 0.79368 $32,459,616
30 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $63,779,263 $41,151,793 0.78738 $32,402,074
31 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $64,034,381 $41,406,911 0.78113 $32,344,194
32 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $64,290,518 $41,663,048 0.77493 $32,285,983
33 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $64,547,680 $41,920,210 0.76878 $32,227,446
34 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $64,805,871 $42,178,401 0.76268 $32,168,589
35 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $65,065,094 $42,437,624 0.75663 $32,109,418
36 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $65,325,355 $42,697,885 0.75062 $32,049,939
37 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $65,586,656 $42,959,186 0.74466 $31,990,156
38 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $65,849,003 $43,221,533 0.73875 $31,930,075
39 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $66,112,399 $43,484,929 0.73289 $31,869,703
40 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $66,376,848 $43,749,378 0.72707 $31,809,043
41 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $66,642,356 $44,014,886 0.72130 $31,748,102
42 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $66,908,925 $44,281,455 0.71558 $31,686,884
43 $0 ($17,001,800) ($5,625,670) $67,176,561 $44,549,091 0.70990 $31,625,395
NPV ($633,766,966)
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